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I Tried to Break My Own Security Suite. It Fought Back (and I Found 1 Thing I'm Not Happy About)

说明与用途

作者对 ATLOCK v5 进行了自测、位翻转攻击、模糊测试和公钥场景测试,发现发送者固定功能仅发出警告而不强制失败,可能影响安全性。

问题

The author wanted to validate the security of ATLOCK v5 by performing a comprehensive attack in a clean environment, but discovered a design choice that may weaken trust when a sender key is pinned.

结果

ATLOCK v5 passed all self‑tests, bit‑flip and fuzzing attacks, and public‑key scenarios without silent corruption or crashes. Performance measurements show Argon2id provides strong GPU resistance. However, the sender‑pinning feature only warns instead of hard‑failing, which may be a usability or security concern.

工作流

  • Create a fresh venv and install dependencies
  • Run ATLOCK_v5.py --selftest to verify built‑in checks
  • Perform 200 random bit‑flips on a 5 MB encrypted file and verify rejection
  • Run the built‑in fuzzer with 300 mutations and confirm no crashes
  • Measure performance of sealing, opening, and Argon2id hashing
  • Test public‑key encryption/decryption and signature verification
  • Attempt to decrypt a file with a mismatched expected sender key and observe warning behavior

证据

I built a single-file security suite in pure Python. Before release, I locked it in a clean virtual environment and tried to wreck it.

来源

200 out of 200 rejected. Zero silent corruption. Zero crashes.

来源

$ python ATLOCK_v5.py --fuzz 300 fuzzed 300 container mutations, 100 garbage shares, 60 junk imports: no crashes, no silent corruption.

来源

I tested sender pinning: Bob says "I only trust files from this key," then I hand him a file signed by someone else.

来源

It decrypted anyway. The app shows WARNING: this is NOT the sender key you pasted! but it does not stop.

来源

  • 记录日期: 2026-10-01T09:38:03.046Z