Reaching your own LAN without port forwarding, public URLs, or a VPN concentrator
Description and use
Lantunnel enables secure, private access between NAT‑behind devices without port forwarding, public tunnels, or VPN concentrators, using direct QUIC paths and encrypted relays.
Problem
Users with devices behind NAT need secure, private access to each other without exposing services to the public internet or relying on a VPN concentrator.
Outcome
Lantunnel enables secure, private, direct or encrypted relay communication between devices behind NAT without exposing services to the public internet, eliminating the need for port forwarding or a VPN concentrator.
Workflow
- 1. Run
lantunnel-admin init-tunnelon the owner machine to create a tunnel and generate a gateway public scope. - 2. Run
lantunnel-admin add-peerto issue a signed.peerprofile for each device. - 3. Deploy
lantunnel-gatewayon a public host (or use the hosted service) and configure it with the public IP and ports. - 4. Copy the public
.scopefile to the gateway host and start the gateway withlantunnel-gateway --config configs/gateway.yaml. - 5. On each device, run
lantunnel-client tunnel import <peer-file>to import the profile. - 6. Start the client (
lantunnel-client connect '<tunnel_id>'or--headlessfor servers). - 7. Applications use the local SOCKS5 proxy at 127.0.0.1:1080 or native routes to reach peers.
- 8. When two devices are on networks that allow hole punching, traffic flows directly; otherwise it is sealed and relayed through the gateway.
- 9. Manage access control locally on each target device; the gateway never sees plaintext.
- 10. Optional: use the hosted Lantunnel service for a free, unmetered gateway.
- 11. Monitor and revoke peers by deleting their
.peerfiles or updating the gateway configuration.
Evidence
Lantunnel is my attempt at a fourth option: a small private mesh where peers talk directly whenever the network allows it, and where the fallback path still cannot read your traffic.
Relayed payloads are sealed with XChaCha20-Poly1305 under keys derived from an X25519 exchange between the two peers.
There is no tunnel password, no group secret, no bearer token to leak into a wiki page.
- Record date: 2026-09-07T01:36:41.018Z