Threat-modeling the LAN sync in my wildlife app (as a beginner)

Описание и применение

Разработчик создал безопасный LAN‑синхронный механизм для приложения Wildlife Incident Handoff, используя ECDH, HKDF и AES‑256‑GCM, но оставил пробелы в передней секретности и ручной проверке отпечатков.

Задача

Designing a secure LAN sync feature for a wildlife incident recording app to prevent data leakage, impersonation, and other network threats.

Результат

The LAN sync feature now encrypts data, uses per‑install keypairs, and requires manual pairing approval, reducing the risk of data leakage and impersonation. However, gaps remain in forward secrecy, human verification, and comprehensive testing.

Рабочий процесс

• 1. Generate a unique keypair per install. 2. Exchange a pairing code and manually approve pairing requests. 3. Perform P‑256 ECDH to derive a shared secret. 4. Derive an AES‑256‑GCM encryption key using HKDF. 5. Encrypt incident records with the derived key before transmission. 6. Include a counter in each message to prevent replay. 7. Reject requests from unpaired devices and from devices when sync is disabled. 8. Provide a fingerprint for manual verification to mitigate impersonation.

Доказательства

Data is encrypted (AES-256-GCM) with a key both devices agree on (P-256 ECDH + HKDF)

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Each install has its own keypair and a fingerprint you can compare

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The first device has to manually approve every request

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Each message carries a counter, and old counters are rejected, even after a restart

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The sync endpoint rejects untrusted devices

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Pairing and sync requests are rejected when sync is disabled

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