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AtlasRepo

Your AI agent reads your Jira, Slack and inbox. Some of that text is talking to it, not you.

Description and use

mcp-warden sanitizes incoming data from external sources, removing hidden instructions and quarantining suspicious fields, enabling safe use of AI agents.

Problem

AI agents can ingest untrusted external text that contains hidden or explicit instructions aimed at the agent, potentially leading to malicious actions.

Outcome

mcp-warden effectively removes hidden instructions and quarantines suspicious fields, allowing developers to safely use AI agents with external data sources.

Workflow

  • Install mcp-warden via brew or script
  • Run mcp-warden install to register hooks in supported agents
  • Configure trusted/untrusted servers in ~/.mcp-warden/config.toml
  • Optionally wrap servers with proxy using JSON config
  • Agent reads sanitized output; withheld fields trigger a notice with quarantine ID
  • User reviews withheld content with mcp-warden show ID
  • User releases content with mcp-warden release ID or approves sensitive calls with mcp-warden approve TOKEN

Evidence

mcp-warden is one Rust binary. No service, no account, no network calls of its own. It works with Claude Code, Codex and Cursor on Linux, macOS and Windows.

Source

It strips content a person would not see, withholds and quarantines fields that look like injection (the agent gets a notice instead of the payload)

Source

The hook denies it, because an injected instruction could tell it to.

Source

  • Record date: 2026-10-12T14:41:18.095Z